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“BEING THERE” MATTERS—BUT WHERE?
James F. Miskel
Which parts of the world will be most important to the United States inthe future? Where should the United States be ready to fight a war?
During the Cold War the answers to these questions seemed obvious. The parts
of the world that were most strategically important to the United States were the
lands along the Nato–Warsaw Pact fissure in Central Europe, and Northeast
Asia, where two allies, Japan and South Korea, abutted the two largest commu-
nist powers, the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. Other parts of
the world could become strategically important if events there involved a Soviet
or Chinese client, or even a potential client. When this happened, that part of the
world became, ipso facto, an area of great importance to the United States, lead-
ing sometimes to covert conflict and sometimes to large-scale fighting.
Today, if only because there no longer is a superpower for the United States to
balance against, U.S. interest in some regions has
diminished. This has, for example, been true with
respect to Africa. While the United States and the
Soviet Union played strategic chess against one an-
other in the Third World, African countries were
perceived as important. But once the chess game
ended, the great powers lost interest in the rooks
and pawns. Developments in Africa ceased having
balance-of-power ramifications, so the United States
and most other major powers started to pay less at-
tention to them. Some other parts of the world, of
course, remain of great interest to the United States,
but now for economic reasons as much as, if not more
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than, traditional political-military balance-of-power reasons. One particular as-
pect of national security strategy—military forward presence—deserves reas-
sessment in light of the shift that is taking place in security interests.
The driving factor in determining the requirements for routine, noncrisis
forward presence ought to be reasoned, objective judgments by the president
and Congress about the relative importance of the various regions of the world
to the United States. Indeed, the challenge for national strategists is to determine
whether the regions that are important to the nation today will be equally im-
portant tomorrow and, if not, to begin making the necessary adjustments in for-
ward presence strategy. Meeting this challenge requires clear and objective
thinking about where national interests may lie in the future. It requires think-
ing that is unencumbered by the traditional Euro-centricity of the American
foreign policy establishment and media, or by the habit acquired in the Cold
War of instinctively assuming that the national-interest glass in some regions is
perpetually more than half full.
One way of forcing policy makers to take a more objective approach and limit
the influence of nostalgic assumptions about military forward presence is to de-
fine specific criteria for determining the intensity of U.S. national interests. Un-
til such time as the global balance of military power shifts and a serious global
threat begins to emerge, the most sensible criteria are economic. For the pur-
poses of reassessing American military forward presence strategies, the most
telling statistics involve interdependence. The practical effect of adopting eco-
nomic criteria would be to accord a higher priority to those parts of the world
where economic interdependence with the United States is growing and a lower
priority where it is diminishing.
Forward presence entails the deployment of military forces overseas on a full-time
basis or on rotational cycles during noncrisis periods. When crises do occur in
important regions, adjustments are often made in the pattern of forward pres-
ence deployments to signal high levels of concern or to deter military action by
third parties. For example, in 1997 and 1998 military forces were deployed to
Southwest Asia to increase the existing levels of forward presence in response to
threatening gestures by Iraq against Kuwait. Another example occurred in 1996,
when the United States deployed warships to the seas around Taiwan in response
to escalated tensions between Beijing and Taipei. However, the principal focus of
this article is noncrisis, routine forward presence—although crisis deployments
such as these will be discussed.
Forward presence has two broad goals. The first is to help ensure regional sta-
bility and promote productive relations with the United States by demonstrating
its national interest in a region or an individual state as well as its commitment to
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2
Naval War College Review, Vol. 54 [2001], No. 3, Art. 3
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss3/3
the defense of friends and allies. From this perspective, both routine forward
presence during noncrisis periods and special deployments in response to crises
are as much diplomatic-political functions as they are military. To maximize
the yield from this perspective,
forward presence should be allo-
cated primarily to those parts of
the world that will be most im-
portant to the United States in the
future. That is to say, the United
States government should do what any sagacious investor would do: it should
invest more heavily in areas where the prospective returns are great and only
sparingly, if at all, where the potential for profit is slight.
The second broad goal of both routine and crisis-oriented forward presence
is to improve the ability of U.S. military forces to fight and win wars that are not
deterred. Forward presence does this by providing opportunities to promote
interoperability between U.S. and friendly forces. Forward presence also in-
creases the operational awareness by American military forces of the conditions
(such as terrain, coastlines, currents, weather, and infrastructure) in parts of the
world where they may have to fight. To maximize yield from the military per-
spective, forward presence should be concentrated in areas of the world that are
both troubled by the risk of war and important to the United States. In other
words, the prospective returns on investments in operational awareness and
interoperability are greatest when and where there is a reasonable likelihood
that these capabilities will actually be used in war. There is, obviously, little prac-
tical value to be gained by making substantial investments in interoperability or
operational awareness in regions where the United States has no intention to
fight because it has no important interests to defend.
The United States currently maintains high levels of forward presence in sev-
eral parts of the world—Western Europe, the Mediterranean basin, Northeast
Asia, and Southwest Asia. Numerous factors undoubtedly affect this allocation
of forward presence resources. Alliance commitments are, of course, a main
factor, but they are to a great extent discretionary. Treaties between allies do not
ordinarily specify the exact levels of routine, noncrisis military forward presence
that the allies will maintain in each other’s territory. Rather, the treaties typically
commit their signatories “only” to commit forces when war erupts. The North
Atlantic Treaty of 1949, the founding document for the world’s premier and
longest-lasting military alliance, makes no mention of military forward pres-
ence.1 The treaty commits its members to defend each other against attack and
thus authorizes—but does not require any specific level of—U.S. military for-
ward presence during peacetime.
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ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE AND
THE REGIONAL APPROACH
The aphorism that “trade follows the flag,” if it was ever true, no longer holds, at
least in the sense that U.S. businessmen do not now require diplomats or the
military to pave the way before opening shop on distant shores. There are no
exotic ports left for the fleet to open, no remote, fog-shrouded kingdoms for
soldier-diplomats to intimidate into accepting Western merchants and mer-
chandise. The businessman’s way has already been paved, at least as much as mil-
itary forward presence is capable of doing so. It is not physical access that keeps
entrepreneurs out of some markets but rather doubts about the opportunities in
those markets relative to others. Today, and even more tomorrow, the flag will
follow trade. In that light, military forward presence can be a way of nurturing
the political-military stability that is essential to continuing economic growth
and political-economic reform. It can also be a tool for maintaining access to
existing markets. The best places to apply that tool are the regions with which
the United States is, or is becoming, economically interdependent.
Economic interdependence can be measured through statistics on trade flows
and foreign investment. Thus the critical regions would be those that account
for the highest proportions of American trade and foreign investment. All other
things being equal, a region representing 20 percent of U.S. trade and invest-
ment ought to be accorded a higher priority in terms of military forward pres-
ence than one accounting for only 2 percent. Of course, “all other things” never
stay equal over time; levels of presence should be adjusted to reflect the risk
of instability in the high-priority regions. When the risk of instability in a
high-priority region is low, relatively little military forward presence need be
maintained. When the risk increases, consideration should be given to deploy-
ing forces.
Political-military alliances are, of course, important—but alliances are means
to an end, not ends in themselves. It is well to remember this distinction between
ends and means. No alliance lasts forever, and even when the form of an alliance
remains intact, its substance may change. This has already happened to Nato.
Once a mutual defense organization integral to the security of the United States,
Nato has become a regional policeman without a central role in the defense of its
North American members. Some of the positions taken by the United States in
the mid-1990s appear to concede this point, at least indirectly. At the time,
Clinton administration spokespersons correctly argued that even though the
Cold War was over, membership in Nato was still in the national interest because
it gave the United States “a seat at the table” of Europe. That is, it gave Washing-
ton an official platform from which to participate in European deliberations. In
the mid-1990s the crucial European deliberations did not involve mutual defense
2 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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issues; they involved the humanitarian crisis in Bosnia and the economic mat-
ters associated with Europe’s nascent single economic community. Since the
Clinton White House was (as the preceding administration was, and as the suc-
ceeding administration is) reluctant to participate directly in peacekeeping op-
erations in Bosnia, it seems reasonable to conclude that the “seat at the table”
was considered important primarily because it provided a way to ensure that
U.S. economic interests were protected as Europe formulated community-wide
economic policies and regulations.
With what geographic “units,” then, should U.S. policy makers deal, if even
Nato no longer defines a zone sufficiently cohesive and homogeneous in terms
of American interests? In gen-
eral, it is useful to think in terms
of regions smaller than a conti-
nent, or than the lands encom-
passed by an alliance like Nato,
or than the expanses of territory
that have been assigned by the Unified Command Plan to each of the military’s
regional commanders in chief (or “CinCs,” such as of the Southern or Central
Commands). All such groupings are too broad and heterogeneous; for example,
the Southern Cone of South America differs markedly from the rest of the conti-
nent in terms of its economic growth, the robustness of its democratic reforms,
and the absence of active insurgency movements and border disputes. On the other
hand, focusing on units as small as the individual nation-state is too cumber-
some, and in any event, some economic relationships and diplomatic-security
obligations are transnational.
For these reasons, a regional approach is most suitable for the purposes of
formulating requirements for forward presence. The regional “unit” further
commends itself in that it would force strategists to look at priorities in new and
different ways and thus avoid a pitfall all too common in long-range plan-
ning—implicitly assuming that the future will closely resemble today. Ex-
actly how the regions should be defined will, of course, be a subject for debate;
wherever the boundaries are drawn, incongruities and artificialities will result.
The main point here is that geographical regions larger than states and smaller
than such massive zones as continents or “CinCdoms” are useful units of analy-
sis for determining U.S. national interests.
For the purposes of illustrating the regional approach to U.S. national
economic interests and to the measurement of forward presence requirements,
this article will focus on the Mediterranean Basin and South America.
The Mediterranean has been a major focus of American military forward
presence, particularly naval, for nearly fifty years. Although the level of presence
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has been reduced since the height of the Cold War, the U.S. Sixth Fleet currently
maintains eighteen to twenty ships in the Mediterranean and conducts several
dozen military exercises annually with local navies.2 Since individual ships
rotate in and out of the Sixth Fleet on six-month cycles, between thirty and forty
ships actually gain operational awareness of the Mediterranean and improve
their interoperability with regional navies each year. For its part, South America
is useful for the purposes of comparison, as that continent has traditionally re-
ceived considerably less attention than the Mediterranean. For instance, the
UNITAS exercise series, the principal naval forward presence activity in South
America (annual exercises and port visits over a four-month period), involves
fewer than half as many U.S. ships, aircraft, and personnel as are engaged in
twelve months in the Mediterranean.3
TRADE AND INVESTMENT
The economic interdependence between the United States and various parts of
the world can be at least approximately measured through statistics on trade
flows and foreign investment. The International Monetary Fund compiles data
on the total value of U.S. exports to and imports from each nation in the world.4
These data on bilateral trade flows can be aggregated for geographic regions or
for any other grouping or category of states. The same can be done for statistics
on the amount of U.S. investment in every other nation and the amounts that
other nations have invested in the United States.
By these standards, two geographic regions stand out as being of major eco-
nomic importance to the United States: Western Europe (Ireland, Great Britain,
France, the Low Countries, and Germany) and Northeast Asia (Japan, China,
and South Korea). For some regions the absence of economic importance to the
United States is equally obvious. Central Africa (Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania,
Uganda, Congo, and Kenya) is an example; the United States has no significant
investment in or trade with that region. Most regions—including South Amer-
ica and the Mediterranean—fall between Western Europe and Central Africa in
terms of the level of economic interdependence with the United States.
In the early 1970s, the entire Mediterranean Basin—that is, the countries
with Mediterranean coastlines—accounted for approximately 10 percent of all
U.S. trade (exports and imports combined). Since then, the Mediterranean’s
percentage has steadily declined. During the last five years for which data are
available (1994–98), its share has been in the 6.8–7.3 percent range. The high
end of the range represents a 25 percent reduction over nearly three decades, the
low end a drop of fully one-third. These reductions in the relative position of the
Mediterranean region reflect the dramatic increases that have taken place in U.S.
trade with other regions, particularly the Pacific Rim and the other parts of
3 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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North America. These data suggest that despite significant increases in absolute
values, relative to other parts of the world the Mediterranean region has become
significantly less important in economic terms to the United States.
What is true for the Mediterranean is true as well for each of its subregions.5
The subregions are North Africa (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt), the
Middle East (Cyprus, Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan—which has
no Mediterranean coast but is usually considered a Middle Eastern state), and
southern Europe (Greece, Italy,
Malta, France, Spain, and Portugal).
Albania and the successor states
of the former Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Slovenia,
Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia-
Montenegro) could also be consid-
ered as part of southern Europe. Since none of the latter states has substantial
economic ties to the United States, their inclusion would have no substantial
effect on the data for that subregion.
From 1991 through 1998, the Middle East and North Africa subregions
accounted for only about 1 percent each of U.S. trade. This is not a post–Cold
War phenomenon; these subregions have accounted for roughly the same pro-
portion of American trade since 1970, apart from a blip in the late 1970s and
early 1980s. Of the three Mediterranean subregions, only southern Europe rep-
resents a considerable amount of U.S. trade, about 6 percent. Yet that percentage
was lower in the late 1990s than at any other time in the last thirty years. Over the
course of the 1990s, southern Europe’s share of all U.S. trade decreased by about
15 percent.6
Foreign-investment statistics tell a similar story. Most U.S. investment in the
Mediterranean takes place in southern Europe. As a percentage of all American
overseas investment, that in the North Africa and the Middle East subregions is
negligible; each accounts for less than 1 percent of all U.S. foreign direct invest-
ment. With respect to southern Europe, the preponderance of U.S. investment is
in three countries—Spain, Italy, and France. In 1990 about 9.5 percent of the
total value of all U.S. foreign direct investment was in these three. Since then, the
proportion has been steadily declining, to 6.8 percent in 1998.7
Not only do the trade and investment statistics suggest that the Mediterra-
nean Basin has become relatively less important to the United States, but the
figures actually overstate the region’s economic standing. This is because the
statistics assume that all trade with and investment in France, Spain, and Portu-
gal can be considered “Mediterranean.” France and Spain are, obviously, both
Atlantic and Mediterranean countries, and a considerable volume of U.S. trade
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with and investment in those countries is “Atlantic” in character rather than
Mediterranean. Portugal has no Mediterranean coastline, but it is a member of
Nato and, perhaps for lack of a better alternative, has been considered Mediter-
ranean by U.S. strategists; it is, for example, in the Sixth Fleet’s area of responsi-
bility. The American trade with France, Spain, and Portugal that flows through
Atlantic seaports should be set aside when estimating the significance of U.S.
economic interests in the Mediterranean; U.S. investment in those nations’ busi-
nesses and infrastructure projects that are oriented toward the Atlantic or West-
ern Europe should similarly be excluded. (An example would be a factory that
U.S. investors build in northern France near the Channel tunnel so as to maxi-
mize its access to markets in England and the Low Countries.) The implication
is that the United States may be able to accomplish its forward-presence objec-
tives with France, Spain and Portugal through Atlantic-oriented, instead of
Mediterranean, activities.
Figure 1 depicts the proportion of U.S. trade represented by the two sub-
regions of South America. The data presented on this chart indicate that both
subregions are more economically important to the United States in
terms of trade than are
the Middle Eastern and
North African subregions
of the Mediterranean.
While not high relative to
Western Europe and
Northeast Asia, U.S. trade
with each South American
subregion is about twice
as great as for either
North Africa or the Mid-
dle East. Unlike those for
the latter, the percentages
for the Southern Cone subregions have increased during the 1990s. Until the
very late 1990s, trade with the Andes-Caribbean subregion also tended to in-
crease; the drop-off in 1998 may have been anomalous, a partial result of the
civil war in Colombia (which will be discussed below). The Andes-Caribbean
subregion of South America consists of Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia,
Venezuela, Panama, Guyana, Suriname, and French Guiana. The Southern Cone
includes Chile and the MERCOSUR (common market) countries of Brazil,
Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay. As with Middle East and North Africa, U.S.
investment in the Andes-Caribbean subregion is relatively insignificant as a
percentage of all investment. On the other hand, American investment in the
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Southern Cone has in re-
cent years been increas-
ing , presumably in
response to political and
economic reform. The
value of U.S. investment
in the three largest South-
ern Cone countries (Ar-
gentina, Brazil, Chile)
approaches the value of
that in Spain, France, and
Italy. As figure 2 suggests,
the value of U.S. invest-
ment in the Southern Cone will soon, if recent trends continue, exceed that for
southern Europe.8 Increasing investment can be a precursor of increased trade
volumes. Thus one might expect U.S. trade with the Southern Cone to surge in
the future. Indeed, the long-term prospects for both investment and trade ap-
pear greater for the Southern Cone than for any Mediterranean subregion.
This may be in part a consequence of the fact that unlike southern Europe, the
Southern Cone may only now be entering the “spurt” phase of the economic de-
velopment cycle—when annual growth rates are typically at their highest and
greater than those of mature economies. Furthermore, the Southern Cone has
more abundant and diverse natural resources than southern Europe; it also has a
larger population and higher population growth rates. By 2020, the combined
population of Brazil, Chile, and Argentina is expected to grow from 220 million
today to 260 million. The combined population of Spain, France, and Italy is
predicted to remain virtually flat over the next twenty years, at 160 million. Italy
is expected to experience negative population growth rate during this period.9
On the basis of these economic statistics, the priority for the purposes of for-
ward presence of each of these five subregions would be as given in the table.
Assuming that the threat of war or instability were equal for all of these subre-
gions, the most rational strategy would be to calibrate presence according to
priority. Absent a crisis, there would thus ordinarily be roughly equal levels of
military forward presence for southern Eu-
rope and the Southern Cone; very low levels
would be maintained in the Middle East,
North Africa, and the Andes-Caribbean.
Because economic trends change gradually,
policy makers can be reasonably confident
that a region that is determined to be of
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high priority in 2001 will almost certainly still be in 2004 and 2005. Equally, the
status of southern Europe and the Southern Cone as medium-priority regions
would not be expected to change dramatically over the short term. Thus it makes
sense to base multiyear plans for routine, noncrisis forward presence on endur-
ing interests. Adjustments can be made if threat levels increase.
SECURITY THREATS
Predicting where and when an international incident will occur is a highly com-
plex affair. Threats can develop quickly. That is why the United States has long
maintained a large and sophisticated intelligence apparatus to identify trouble
spots around the globe and to evaluate continuously the prospects for war and
instability. Definitive assessments are, of course, beyond the reach of this article,
but it does seem reasonable to assume that the probability of war is currently
quite low in Western Europe, a high-priority region for the United States. Insta-
bility appears more likely in another high-priority region, Northeast Asia. Al-
though the risk appears to be diminishing as North Korea opens itself to the
West, until such time as the risk is significantly diminished, a high level of for-
ward presence in Northeast Asia may make a strategic difference in terms of pre-
venting war.
Of the two subregions in South America, the one that is more likely to experi-
ence instability is the Andes-Caribbean. Colombia is already consumed with a
violent, anarchic civil war involving at least two major insurgent groups. The
disorder has had ripple effects in neighboring Panama, Ecuador, Venezuela, and
Brazil, effects that could well worsen. Cross-border conflict between well-armed
Colombian paramilitaries and the military forces of neighboring countries is
a distinct possibility, as is collaboration between the Colombian insurgents
and criminal or rebel groups in nearby countries. This could have dramatic
long-term consequences for American policy in the Andes-Caribbean region, as
political and economic reforms are still quite fragile there. Conversely, the risk
of instability in the Southern Cone is quite low. Democratic and economic re-
forms appear to have taken root, the territorial disputes between traditional ri-
vals Chile and Argentina have been resolved, and the subregional nations are
increasingly working together to address common challenges. For example, in
1996 Argentina, Chile, Brazil, and Uruguay collectively pressured Paraguayan
military officers into abandoning a planned coup against the elected government.10
In the Mediterranean, tensions between Israel and its neighbors continue to
flare, but there are no indications that the tensions will lead to another general
war in the subregion. It is, in fact, difficult to determine exactly what benefits
military forward presence can bring in the Middle East that are not already be-
ing achieved by U.S. diplomats in sponsoring the peace process—more recently,
3 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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attempts to restore the peace process—between Israel and the Palestinians. Fur-
thermore, instability in the Middle East may simply be of the type that military
forward presence is least likely to deter; that at least is what the historical record
suggests. The Lebanese civil war of the early 1980s was only temporarily inter-
rupted, not deterred or stopped, by
the presence of the U.S. Navy off-
shore, or even by the “boots on the
ground” of American, French, and
Italian peacekeepers. Similarly, the
intifada and the continuing vio-
lence that began in late 2000 in Gaza and the West Bank were obviously not de-
terred by U.S. naval forward presence in the eastern Mediterranean. Indeed, it
may simply be unrealistic to expect Palestinian factions or extremists of any
kind to forgive past grievances, relinquish claims for territory, or back away from
their convictions simply because foreign warships routinely visit local ports, or
because one indigenous navy or another can demonstrate its interoperability
with the U.S. Navy in offshore exercises.
It might be argued that due to the proximity of the Middle East to Southwest
Asia, military forward presence in the Middle East contributes to deterrence in
the Persian Gulf. If this is true, the opposite must also hold—that is, that the
objective of deterring interstate conflict in the Middle East can be served by mil-
itary forward presence in Southwest Asia.
As for North Africa and southern Europe, at present the risk of war also seems
to be low. In southern Europe, most of the major interstate issues arising out of
the dissolution of “greater Yugoslavia” have now been resolved, about as well as
anything short of total war can resolve them. Furthermore, so long as military
peacekeepers from Nato, with or without U.S. participation, remain on the
ground in Kosovo and Bosnia, the contribution that other forms of military
forward presence can make to deterrence seems marginal.
As noted previously, however, there is more to forward presence than deter-
rence or demonstrations of national interest. Forward presence also enables the
U.S. military to acquire operational awareness—practical knowledge about
conditions in a theater. It also allows U.S. forces to improve their ability to work
together with indigenous military forces and with allied forces that are not resi-
dent in the particular subregion but operate there.
Plainly, the benefits of current operational awareness of in-theater conditions
and confidence in interoperability with friendly forces are time-sensitive;
they are obviously most valuable when there is a high likelihood of war and
when the United States is very likely to become directly involved. Just as plainly,
operational awareness and interoperability are less valuable when conditions are
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pacific. They are least valuable when the United States has no significant inter-
ests to defend.
In subregions where high levels of military forward presence are continu-
ously maintained, the United States is in effect making a considerable invest-
ment in current operational awareness and interoperability with friendly forces.
Setting aside national interests for a moment, that is prudent when the risk of
war is continuously high (as it was during the Cold War) but profligate when the
threat is thought to be low. It may even be excessive when low threat levels are
assumed to be transitory, because most forms of military forward presence can
be increased if and when threat conditions become more adverse.
Based on this brief tour of the security horizon in South America and the
Mediterranean, it would appear that absent a new crisis the only zone where the
threat warrants a higher level of presence than economic interests alone would
dictate is in the Andes-Caribbean subregion.
STRATEGIC COMMODITIES
Overall trade and investment statistics may obscure the significance of strategi-
cally important commodities to the United States. This could cause national
strategists to underestimate not only the impact of a supply interruption on U.S.
economic interests but also the contribution that military forward presence can
make to preventing interruptions. Oil is the standard example, one that has
particular salience given the recent spikes in oil prices as well as the tensions in
the Middle East subregion.
There are two general aspects to the oil equation, production and distribution.
It seems reasonable to presume that forward presence by the United States
would tend to deter invasions of oil-producing states. That is to say, the presence
of U.S. warships, air forces, and ground troops in a subregion can contribute to
interstate stability by creating at least the perception that the United States is
primed to defend oil-producing states from attack. This argues strongly for high
levels of military forward presence in and around the Persian Gulf, due to the
huge volume of production that might be lost in a war, and to the high costs of
evicting an invader—as in Operation DESERT STORM. This same argument
could be used to justify forward presence in other oil-producing or potentially
oil-producing areas; none of the Mediterranean subregions fall into this cate-
gory. Developments in the Middle East affect oil production by influencing the
political decisions on oil output by Arab states in other subregions, but none of
the states in the Middle East subregion as we have defined it (Cyprus, Turkey,
Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel) is a significant oil producer.
An area that does fall into the category of a potentially important oil producer
is the Andes-Caribbean subregion of South America. Venezuela is a major oil
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producer and shares a troubled and occasionally contested border with Colom-
bia. Colombia, in turn, has both oil reserves and a domestic insurgency problem
that could destabilize the entire region. Ecuador also has oil reserves and has al-
ready experienced spillover from Colombia’s turmoil. (For example, in Septem-
ber 2000 an estimated fifteen thousand Colombians fled into Ecuador to avoid
the fighting between the Colombian government and an insurgent force.)11
Oil distribution and pricing should, perhaps, be approached differently than
oil production, at least in terms of evaluating the contribution that military
forward presence can realistically make. Extensive naval forward presence in the
Mediterranean did not keep oil prices low or supplies high during the 1970s,
when two oil embargoes led to economic recession in the United States and
Europe. Nor have high levels of forward presence of naval, air, and ground
forces in Southwest Asia and the
Mediterranean kept prices from
sharply rising in 2000. Indeed, it is
unrealistic to expect military for-
ward presence of any kind to pre-
vent sovereign states like Saudi
Arabia and Venezuela from deciding to limit oil production in order to raise
prices. Iraq may be the best example of the limited effect that forward presence
can have in this respect. There has been an extraordinarily heavy military for-
ward presence in and around Iraq for the ten years since the end of the Gulf
War; large parts of Iraqi airspace are regularly patrolled by U.S. aircraft—a
particularly intrusive form of presence made necessary by the international
community’s desire to protect minority groups inside Iraq. Yet even under these
conditions, Iraq has manipulated its oil production in an attempt to inflate the
prices paid by the West.
Oil distribution to world markets can, of course, be disrupted in other ways.
A state could mine or blockade a critical sea-lane. For example, during the
Iran-Iraq War in the mid-1980s, sections of the Persian Gulf were mined by Iran,
and Iranian Revolutionary Guards used captured oil platforms to attack tanker
traffic near the Straits of Hormuz. (The U.S. response was to provide military
escorts for the tankers.) Continuous military forward presence might deter such
actions, but that is an expensive approach to what is ultimately a constabulary
function. In comparison to the difficulties and expense of reversing production
problems caused by the conquest of an oil-producing state, reversing distribu-
tion problems created by mining and blockades should be easy. It should be
within the capacity of expeditionary forces from the United States or of local
military forces that, in the Mediterranean, are part of the Nato structure and are
more robust than their equivalents in many other parts of the world.
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The bottom line appears to be that maintaining a continuously high level of
military forward presence is not an efficient or effective approach to the threat of
oil distribution problems. There is a more effective and perhaps more efficient
approach—the strategic petroleum reserve. The United States built a strategic
petroleum reserve for the express purpose of cushioning the effects of interrup-
tions in distribution and of sudden price hikes. Investing in larger petroleum
reserves is a better hedge against distribution problems and price hikes than is
military forward presence.
IMPLICATIONS
Until the global balance of military power changes—and perhaps even after it
does change—the United States should measure its military forward presence
requirements on the basis of economic criteria. Such criteria should be applied
in a regional framework, so as to guard against nostalgic assumptions that the
parts of the world that are important to the United States today will be equally
vital in the future. The basic allocations would then be adjusted as conflict in
particular parts of the world became more likely. The proposed approach im-
plies that military forward presence resources may not presently be allocated in
a way that properly reflects the emerging future.
The various levels of routine, noncrisis military forward presence can be
thought of as a continuum ranging from continuously high to none. The United
States maintains continuously high forward presence in Western Europe, North-
east Asia, and the Mediterranean. Forces permanently stationed in these regions
conduct cycles of interactions with local militaries (for instance, in exercises, in-
formation exchanges, planning, port visits, and other, largely ceremonial, activi-
ties). At the other end of the spectrum are regions like Central Africa, where the
United States routinely maintains no military forward presence. That is to say,
military forces are neither permanently stationed in nor periodically deployed
to Central Africa to demonstrate national interest, deter interstate conflict, ac-
quire operational awareness, or improve interoperability with local forces.
Most other regions fall between these two extremes. The two South American
subregions are examples. In the Southern Cone subregion, the level of military
forward presence might be classified as intermittent—largely confined to peri-
odic port visits, exercises, and information exchanges. Presence in the An-
des-Caribbean is determined by U.S. involvement in the war on drugs rather
than an overall strategy for the subregion.
If national interests were determined on the basis of economic interdepen-
dence, it would appear the United States should consider reducing the level of
military forward presence it maintains in the Mediterranean Basin. The savings
could be transferred to other purposes, including force modernization. The
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savings could also be applied to military forward presence in other regions, such
as South America. Economic statistics suggest, in fact, that the Southern Cone
will soon become as important to the United States as southern Europe—a Med-
iterranean subregion where particularly high levels of military forward presence
are maintained—and that the Andes-Caribbean subregion has a particularly
severe risk of instability.
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